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Jurisdictional Statement
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4103(2)G); this case was originally assigned to the Utah Supreme Court and then
poured over to this Court. (R. 1283-84.)
The district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order on November 2, 2015. (Add. A, R. 1262-70.) Appellant Benjamin Arriaga
filed a timely amended notice of appeal on November 18, 2015. (R. 1289.)

Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Arriaga's
petition for post-conviction relief on summary judgment, holding that Mr.
Arriaga's guilty plea to first-degree murder was knowing and voluntary, despite
Mr. Arriaga asserting twice during the plea hearing that he acted in self-defense.

Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.1108-12.)

Issue 2: Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Arriaga's
petition for post-conviction relief on summary judgment, holding that Mr.
Arriaga's English-speaking counsel was not ineffective when he did not have an
interpreter present when he discussed the guilty plea with Mr. Arriaga, who
spoke only a few random English words?

Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R. 1117-18.)
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Standard of Review for Both Issues: Appellate courts "review an
appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief
for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions oflaw.
Similarly, [appellate courts] review a grant of summary judgment for correctness,
granting no deference to the lower court. [Appellate courts] affirm a grant of
summary judgment when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
oflaw. In making this assessment, [courts] view the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."

Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ,I 18,293 P.3d 345 (quotations and footnotes omitted).

Determinative Provisions
The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Upon advice of his trial counsel, Mr. Arriaga entered a guilty plea to first-

degree murder. (R. 77.) He timely petitioned the district court for post-conviction
relief. (R. 1, 61.)

2
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The district court held an evidentiary hearing, but it suspended the hearing
before receiving all the testimony from Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel or Mr. Arriaga
himself so that Mr. Arriaga could file an amended petition. (R. 505, 548-49.)
Before the district court scheduled another hearing on the amended petition, the
State moved for summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga's amended petition. (R. 55253, 1095-96.) The district court granted that motion, dismissing the amended

petition. (Add. A, R. 1262-70.)
Mr. Arriaga timely appeals.
2.

Statement of Facts
As Mr. Arriaga's post-conviction petition was dismissed on summary

judgment, the facts below are recited in the light most favorable to Mr. Arriaga.

See Ross, 2012 UT 93, ,r 18. The evidentiary hearing in this case was not
~

completed (and consequently did not include testimony about the issues raised in
this appeal), so the facts are drawn from Mr. Arriaga's petition, evidence
submitted with the parties' filings, and relevant material from the evidentiary
hearing.
Mr. Arriaga became distraught and angry after he was told that the
decedent was having an affair with his wife. (R. 166, 176, 213-14.) 1 Mr. Arriaga
confronted the decedent and wanted the decedent to admit that he was having
the affair. (R. 167, 228.) The two exchanged punches, Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun
Although they were still married, Mr. Arriaga had been separated from his
wife at the time the affair occurred. (R. 200.)
1
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out of his waistband to scare the decedent (Mr. Arriaga did not intend to shoot
him), and then the decedent lunged at Mr. Arriaga and tried to grab the gun. (R.
167, 177, 228.) The gun went off, and the decedent was shot five times. (R. 141.)
The State charged Mr. Arriaga with first-degree murder, and Mr. Arriaga
pleaded guilty to that charge. (R. 61, 77.)
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, and has a fifth-grade
education. (R. 1339-40.) At the time Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty in this case, he
did not speak English except for a few random words. (Add. C, R. 1177.) His trial
counsel did not speak Spanish. (Id.)
Mr. Arriaga met with his trial counsel immediately before he pleaded
guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) No interpreter was present, so Mr. Arriaga did not fully
understand his trial counsel. (Add. C, R. 1177-78.) In fact, Mr. Arriaga believed
his trial counsel told him he had already been found guilty and that he had to
plead guilty that day. (Add. C, R. 1177.) Because of the language barrier, Mr.
Arriaga did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was
innocent until proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) Had Mr. Arriaga known that he
did not have to plead guilty, he would not have pleaded guilty and would instead
have insisted on going to trial. (Add. C, R. 1179.)
When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea statement
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Add. C, R.
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1178.) And during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he
understood from his trial counsel. (Id.)
At the plea hearing, an interpreter translated for Mr. Arriaga. (R. 78.) The
district court informed Mr. Arriaga of his rights and then asked for a factual
basis:
THE COURT:
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:

THE COURT:
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
[TRIAL COUNSEL]:

THE COURT:
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Okay. Counsel, can you give me a
factual basis?
Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 in
Salt Lake County Mr. ArriagaLuna confronted a man who had
been sleeping with his wife. An
argument and subsequent flight
took place at which time he pulled
out a firearm and he shot the
man[,] killing him.
Is that what happened, Mr.
Arriaga-Luna?
I defended myself. It was not my
intention. I never thought about
hurting him.
Okay. Does that change the plea at
all, counsel?
Your Honor, we had-we had
discussed the imperfect selfdefense concept and that he did
pull out a gun to get the man to
confess to his sleeping with his
wife. And that the man charged at
him but was unarmed. So that is
why he used a gun.
I will find that that is a sufficient
factual basis.
He was drugged and drunk and I
didn't know if he had a weapon, a
knife and that's why I ....
Okay.... Mr. Arriaga-Luna, do you
understand that by pulling the
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THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

trigger you knew you could cause
the death of the gentleman?
Yes.
Okay. Thank you. I will accept that
factual
basis.
Has
anyone
threatened you or forced you to
enter this plea today?
No.
Has anyone made any promises to
you?
No, not [inaudible].
Thank you.... Mr. Arriaga-Luna,
then to the charge of murder, a
first-degree felony, how do you
plead, guilty or not guilty?
Guilty.

(Add. B, R. 413-15.)
After Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty, he was sentenced to 15 years to life
imprisonment, and he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief that is the
subject of this appeal. (R. 77, 1263.) 2
In the petition, Mr. Arriaga asserted, among other things, that his guilty

plea was not knowing and voluntary and that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to communicate with Mr. Arriaga in Spanish to explain the meaning and
(i)

consequences of his guilty plea. (R. 1263-64.)
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. (R. 443,
505.) The court received the testimony of the prosecutor but only received some

Mr. Arriaga originally filed a petition pro se. (R. 1.) The district court then
appointed counsel, and the appointed counsel filed an amended petition. (R. 65.)
The original counsel withdrew, and the district court appointed new counsel, who
filed a second amended petition. (R. 445.) The State moved for summary
judgment on the second amended petition. (R. 566.) For ease, Mr. Arriaga will
refer to his second amended petition as the "petition."
2
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•
testimony from trial counsel because it suspended the hearing tq allow Mr.
Arriaga to file an amended petition to add an additional allegation not relevant to
this appeal. (R. 548-49.)
Before the district court set an evidentiary hearing on the amended
petition, the State moved for summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga's entire petition.
(R. 552-53, 1320-21.) The district court granted the motion. The district court

held that Mr. Arriaga's plea was knowing and voluntary and that his counsel was
not ineffective. (Add. A, R. 1220.) It held that Mr. Arriaga had "not shown that he
should not be bound by the representations he made during the change-of-plea
hearing" and had "not shown that he could not adequately understand his
counsel's advice about the guilty plea." (Add. A, R. 1269.) The court also held,
"Even if Mr. Arriaga misunderstood his counsel's advice in relation to the guilty
plea, any misunderstanding was cured by the Court's plea colloquy and the Plea
Statement," so as a matter oflaw "Mr. Arriaga ha[d] not shown that his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary." (Add. A, R. 1270.)

Summary of the Argument

The Postconviction Remedies Act allows a defendant to challenge his
conviction if it was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution or as a
result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Post-conviction relief is appropriate in
QD
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Mr. Arriaga's case because his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary and it
was obtained as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not knowi~g or voluntary. Twice during the
plea hearing he made self-defense claims that negated an essential element of the
murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not understand the
proceedings. And looking beyond the record of the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga
produced undisputed evidence that the language barrier between him and his
trial counsel prevented him from understanding the nature and consequences of
his plea. The district court erred when it held that Mr. Arriaga's plea was knowing
and voluntary.
Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was also the result of ineffective assistance of
counsel. It is undisputed that Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel spoke no Spanish, and
~

Mr. Arriaga is a native Spanish speaker who at the time he pleaded guilty spoke
almost no English. Right before the plea hearing, Mr. Arriaga met with his trial
counsel without an interpreter. After that meeting, Mr. Arriaga believed his
counsel told him that he had to plead guilty. When Mr. Arriaga entered the plea
hearing, he was operating under what he believed his attorney told him. He
would not have entered his plea had he not believed his attorney told him he had
to.
The undisputed evidence showed that Mr. Arriaga's pleas were not
knowing or voluntary, and that his plea was a result of ineffective assistance of
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counsel. The district court erred when it granted the State's summary judgment
motion.
Argument
1.

Mr. Arriaga's Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act, a defendant may challenge his

conviction if it was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution. Utah
Code§ 78B-9-104(1)(a). "A guilty plea involves the waiver of several
constitutional rights and is therefore valid under the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution only if it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."

State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,r 16,279 P.3d 371 (quotation omitted).
1.1

Mr. Arriaga Made Statements at the Plea Hearing Showing
that He Did Not Understand the Essential Elements of
First-Degree Murder, the Charge to which He Pleaded
Guilty

In post-conviction relief cases, a defendant has to show that a guilty plea
was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ,r 26, 184
P.3d 1226; Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, ,r 17, 88 P.3d 353. "A plea is not
knowing and voluntary when the record demonstrates that the accused does not
understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving, or
when he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot
stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,r 16
9
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(quotation omitted). "To have a complete understanding of the charge ... a
defendant must possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Id. ,r
29 (quotation omitted). "In determining whether a defendant understands the
law in relation to the facts, courts review whether the defendant understood the
critical or essential elements of the crime to which he pled guilty." Id. ,r 30
(quotations and footnotes omitted).
In this case, the undisputed facts show that Mr. Arriaga had an incomplete
understanding of the essential elements of a murder charge; instead, he made
statements during the plea hearing suggesting that he acted in self-defense. If he
did act in self-defense, even if his conduct was not legally justified, then he would
have been guilty of manslaughter, not murder.
Under Utah law, a defendant's intentional or knowing killing of another
may constitute murder. Utah Code § 76-5-203(2)(a). But it is an affirmative
defense to murder-and the defendant is entitled to have a murder charge
reduced to a manslaughter charge-if the defendant caused the decedent's death
-

"under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or
excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally justified or excusable
under the existing circumstances." Id. § 76-5-203(4)(a), (c)(i).3

The difference between a knowing or intentional killing and a knowing or
intentional killing premised upon a mistaken but reasonable belief that the killing
was justified by law is significant. Under Utah law, murder is a first-degree felony
and is punishable by an indeterminate term of imprisonment of not less than
fifteen years and potentially for life. Utah Code § 76-5-203(3). However, an
intentional or knowing killing premised upon a mistaken but reasonable belief
3
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(i)

The Utah statute defining murder, Utah Code§ 76-5-201, "does not now
(although it once did) include the term 'unlawfully,' nor do any of the specific
homicide sections." CRIMINAL MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D, § CR1401,
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/. But Utah law requires the State
disprove imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt once a defendant puts
forth evidence of imperfect self-defense; the State bears the ultimate burden of
disproving that the defendant acted in imperfect self-defense. State v. Campos,
2013 UT App 213, ,I,r 43-45, 309 P .3d 1160. In fact, the Model Jury Instruction
for the crime that Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to (first-degree felony murder or
aggravated murder) lists disproving a defense (such as self-defense) as an
element of the crime:
The defendant, [NAME], is charged with Aggravated
Murder. You cannot convict (him)(her) of this offense
unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the
evidence, each of the following elements:
1.
That the defendant, [NAME];
2.
Intentionally or knowingly;
3.
Caused the death of [VICTIM'S NAME];
4.
Under one or more of the following circumstances:
[Insert All Applicable Aggravating Circumstances] [;
and]
5.
*That the defense(s) of _ _ _ _ _ _ __
do(es) not apply. ...

that the killing was justified constitutes manslaughter, a second-degree felony.
Id. § 76-5-205(1)(b), (2). Under Utah law, a conviction of a second-degree felony
results in an indeterminate term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years. Id. § 76-3-203(2).
11
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*

. The committee recommends that practitioners

consider replacing this phrase with more specific
language relating to the legal justification or excuse at
issue in the case. For example, if the issue is self-defense,
this element could be tailored to: "That the defendant did
not act in self-defense."
CRIMINAL MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D, § CR1402 ( emphasis

added).

Disproving an imperfect self-defense claim is an element the State would have to
prove, and "[w]ithout knowing the elements that the State would have to prove, a
defendant cannot intelligently weigh the risks and benefits of going to trial versus
pleading guilty." Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,I 30.
Here, Mr. Arriaga made two statements during the plea hearing showing
that he did not understand the essential elements of murder; specifically, he
raised an imperfect self-defense argument evidencing that he did not fully
understand that the State would have to disprove imperfect self-defense.
When the district court asked for a factual basis, Mr. Arriaga's attorney
responded that Mr. Arriaga and the decedent got into a fight, and Mr. Arriaga
pulled out a gun and shot the decedent. (Add. B, R. 413.) Mr. Arriaga then stated,
"I defended myself. It was not my intention. I never thought about hurting him."
(Id.) The district court then asked if Mr. Arriaga's statement changed the plea,

and Mr. Arriaga's attorney stated that he had discussed the "imperfect self-

Ill

defense concept." (Id.) Immediately after Mr. Arriaga's attorney finished talking,
the district court noted, "I will find that that is a sufficient factual basis." (Id.) Mr.
Arriaga again interjected, "He was drugged and drunk and I didn't know ifhe had
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ti)

a weapon, a knife and that's why I .... " (Id.) The district court then asked Mr.
Gt

Arriaga if he understood that by pulling the trigger he could kill the decedent, and
Mr. Arriaga said yes. (Add. B, R. 414.) He then entered his guilty pleas. (Add. B,
R. 415.)
In circumstances where a defendant pleads guilty but makes statements
during a plea hearing evidencing that he does not understand the charged crime

(i)

or that negate an element of the charged crime, courts have held that such pleas
are not knowing or voluntary. See United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 190
(2d Cir. 2012) (vacating guilty plea when the defendant persistently disavowed
responsibility for a certain amount of drugs, and the amount of drugs was an
essential element of the crime); United States v. Suarez, 155 F.3d 521,525 (5th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant did not plead guilty to possession with

io

intent to distribute when the defendant stated, "I am only guilty of possession");

See generally State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371,375 (Utah 1996) (holding that even
though defendant acknowledged at one point he had the appropriate mental
state, he made repeated comments that negated his admission and consequently
did not admit to the requisite mental state).
For example, in United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir.
2000), the Seventh Circuit held that a native of Mexico who had only a fifthgrade education and a very limited understanding of English (the exact same
situation Mr. Arriaga is in) did not understand the charges or the acts to which he
was pleading guilty. 205 F.3d at 1026-27. The Seventh Circuit relied on the fact
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that when the district court asked the defendant if he had done the things in the
factual proffer, the defendant responded, "Not all the acts, partially"; when the
district court asked what acts he did not commit, the defendant responded, "Yes,
your Honor, I did." Id. at 1026. The district court did not clear up the defendant's
confusion over what he was pleading to and accepted the defendant's guilty plea.

Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacated the plea. Id. at 1030.
Similarly, in People v. Ramirez, 839 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007), the
court reasoned that a defendant who pleaded guilty to burglary made statements
during his plea hearing that negated his guilty plea. Specifically, the "defendant
insisted during the plea colloquy, albeit in a confused and rambling manner, that
he had permission to enter the residence through an open door and retrieve the
items that he took. These statements explaining defendant's presence in the
house effectively negated his admission to the elements of knowingly entering
unlawfully and intent to commit a crime therein at the time of entry." 839
N .Y.S.2d at 329. Because the district court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry
into the defendant's mental culpability after making his statements, "there is no
indication in the record that defendant's misapprehension of the charges was
corrected or that the plea was voluntary and rational." Id. at 330.
Along the same lines, the Seventh Circuit held that a Spanish-speaking
defendant did not understand the nature of the conspiracy charges against him
when he made statements during his plea hearing that showed he did not
understand the concept of conspiracy or the specific acts to which he was
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pleading guilty. United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761,771 (7th
Cir. 2007).
Similar to the defendants in these cases, Mr. Arriaga asserted twice during
the plea hearing that he had acted in self-defense. (Add B., R. 413.) Rather than
recognizing that Mr. Arriaga would be entitled to a reduction from murder to
manslaughter if the State could not disprove that he acted in imperfect selfdefense, Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel and the prosecutor informed the district court
that a sufficient factual basis existed for murder if Mr. Arriaga admitted that he
had knowingly and intentionally killed the decedent. (Add. B, R. 414.) This
representation was incorrect because Mr. Arriaga made assertions that he was
trying to avail himself of a self-defense argument, an element that is completely
separate from the knowingly and intentional killing element.
No one explained to Mr. Arriaga that he should not plead guilty to murder
where the argument he was trying to make, if successful, would result in a
reduction of the murder charge to a manslaughter charge. (See Add. B, R. 413415.) Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel never asked for a brief recess to discuss the selfdefense issue with Mr. Arriaga and clear up his confusion. (See id.) The district
court never asked Mr. Arriaga ifhe understood the implications of his selfdefense assertions; instead, the district court asked Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel if
Mr. Arriaga's assertions changed the plea, and trial counsel stated, "[W]e had
discus~d the imperfect self-defense concept." (Add. B, R. 413.) Directly after trial
counsel finished his comment, the district court said, "I will find that that is a
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sufficient factual basis." (Add. B, R. 413.) The district court never questioned Mr.
Arriaga about the self-defense assertions or asked him if he understood the
implications of his self-defense assertions.
Without understanding that he could admit to knowingly or intentionally
killing the decedent and that he could still defeat the State's murder charge
through a claim of imperfect self-defense, Mr. Arriaga could not intelligently
weigh the risks and benefits of going to trial versus pleading guilty. Mr. Arriaga's
admission that he knowingly or intentionally caused the death of the decedent
did not resolve the issue of whether the killing was done in self-defense. Mr.
Arriaga's plea was not knowing because he did not understand that his assertions
of self-defense could negate the murder charge.
Given the undisputed evidence in the record that Mr. Arriaga made selfdefense assertions at the guilty plea hearing, the district court erred when it
determined that Mr. Arriaga's plea was knowing and voluntary and when it
granted summary judgment on Mr. Arriaga's petition.
1.2

The Circumstances Surrounding the Guilty Plea Show that
Mr. Arriaga's Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary

Not only do Mr. Arriaga's statements at the plea hearing show that his plea
was not knowing, but the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea show that his
plea was not knowing. When a defendant asserts in a petition for post-conviction
relief that a plea was not knowing, a court examining whether a defendant
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GD

understood the essential elements of the crime may inspect the facts and
(ij)

circumstances surrounding the plea hearing and the information the defendant
received from his attorney before entering the plea. Moench, 2004 UT App 57,

,r 17. The undisputed evidence4 in the record shows that because of the language
<ii

barrier between Mr. Arriaga and his trial counsel, he completely misunderstood
the nature of his guilty plea.
Mr. Arriaga is a native of Mexico, speaks Spanish, has a fifth-grade
education, and did not speak English except for a few random words at the time
he pleaded guilty. (Add. C, R. 1177; R. 1339-40.) His trial counsel did not speak
Spanish. (Add. C, R. 1177.)
Mr. Arriaga met with his trial counsel immediately before he pleaded
guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.) No interpreter was present, so Mr. Arriaga did not fully
understand his trial counsel. (Add. C, R. 1177.) In fact, what Mr. Arriaga believed
his trial counsel told him that Mr. Arriaga had already been found guilty and that
there was no need for a trial; that if Mr. Arriaga won at trial, he would still get
prison time; that Mr. Arriaga had no choice but to sign the plea agreement to get

Mr. Arriaga made these factual assertions in his second amended petition
for post-conviction relief. (R. 445-50.) The State did not answer the second
amended petition; rather, the State moved for summary judgment. (R. 1321.)
There was no evidentiary hearing on the second amended petition, and the
evidentiary hearing the parties held on the first amended petition did not include
evidence pertaining to the knowing nature of the guilty plea. (R. 1321; see R.
502-51.) The State's summary judgment motion did not dispute any of the facts
set forth below in its summary judgment reply. (R. 823-28; 1198-1204.) These
facts are taken from Mr. Arriaga's petition and the affidavit he filed with his
response to the summary judgment motion.
4
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a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment; and that Mr. Arriaga had to plead
guilty that day. (Add. C, R. 1177-78.) Because of the language barrier, Mr. Arriaga
did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was innocent
until proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.)
When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea statement
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read ~t prior to signing it. (Id.) And
during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from
his trial counsel. (Id.)
The undisputed evidence on the record shows that Mr. Arriaga completely
misunderstood the nature of his guilty plea. From his trial counsel he believed he
had to plead guilty, he did not read the plea statement before signing it, and
during the plea hearing he was operating under what he believed his trial counsel
told him. (Add. C, R. 1177-78.) A plea is not knowing or voluntary when a
defendant does not understand constitutional rights or the nature of his plea.

Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 799 (2d Cir. 2006).
That Mr. Arriaga completely misunderstood the plea process is evidenced
in his two assertions during the plea hearing that he was acting in self-defense.
(Add. B, R. 413.) "At any point during the colloquy, the district court could have
taken a brief recess in order to allow counsel to talk with his client confidentially,
address [Mr. Arriaga's] apparent confusion, and determine if he did indeed wish
to proceed with a plea. Such a conference might have helped to avoid the
problems that occurred here." Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d at 772. But such a
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conference did not occur. Mr~ Arriaga continued to operate under a mistaken
belief about the nature of his guilty plea and the elements of murder.
Given the undisputed fact that Mr. Arriaga completely misunderstood the
nature of the guilty plea hearing after talking with his counsel, his failure to read
the plea statement, and his self-defense assertions during the plea hearing that
went unresolved, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Arriaga's plea
was knowing and voluntary and in granting the State's summary judgment
motion.
1.3

The District Court Erred When It Concluded Mr. Arriaga's
Plea Was Knowing and Voluntary

The district court gave two reasons for holding that Mr. Arriaga's guilty
plea was knowing and voluntary. First, the district court reasoned that Mr.
Arriaga was bound by the statements he made during the plea colloquy that he
understood what he was doing. (Add. A, R. 1220, 1269.) Second, the district court
reasoned that Mr. Arriaga's misunderstanding of his counsel's advice regarding
the plea hearing was corrected by the plea colloquy and the plea statement. (Add.
A, R. 1270.) Both of these reasons, however, completely ignore Mr. Arriaga's selfdefense assertions during the plea hearing that were never fully addressed by Mr.
Arriaga's trial counsel or the district court.

It is true that defendants are generally bound by their statements at plea
hearings. If defendants were not bound by their statements and could move to
withdraw their guilty pleas on a mere allegation that they did not understand the
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proceedings, the entire plea system would be thrown into chaos. But that is not
the case here.
Here, Mr. Arriaga twice asserted in the plea hearing that he acted in selfdefense. (Add. B, R. 413.) As argued above, those assertions negated an essential
element of the murder charge and showed that Mr. Arriaga did not understand
the plea proceedings. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence establishes that Mr.
Arriaga is a native Spanish speaker, spoke almost no English when he entered his
plea, and completely misunderstood the advice of his attorney regarding the plea
process. (Add. C, R. 177-78.) And when Mr. Arriaga made his self-defense
assertions in the plea hearing, his trial counsel did not explain to him the
consequences of those assertions, and the district court never questioned Mr.
Arriaga about those assertions. (Add. B, R. 413-14.) The plea colloquy did not
correct Mr. Arriaga's misunderstanding; the attorneys and the district court just
brushed by his self-defense assertions, and the court without any further
examination asked Mr. Arriaga ifhe pleaded guilty to murder. (Add. B, R. 41315.)

This case does not involve merely self-serving allegations in an affidavit.
Rather it involves a non-native English speaker, whose attorney did not use an
interpreter to translate for him, who made self-defense assertions on the record
during the plea hearing that directly contradicted his guilty plea and whose self-
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defense assertions were never examined or discussed by his trial counsel or by
the district court.
The district court's order never analyzed the effects of Mr. Arriaga's selfdefense assertions on the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Instead, the district
court put on blinders, ignored the self-defense assertions, and focused on Mr.
Arriaga's largely one-worded answers to its questions that he understood the
proceedings. (See Add. B, R. 410-13.) The district court's order overlooked the
fact that guilty pleas are not knowing and voluntary when a defendant makes
statements during the plea hearing that negate an essential element of the crime
Ci

or that show that he does not understand the charged crime. See Fernandez, 205
F.3d at 1026-27; Culbertson, 670 F.3d at 190; Suarez, 155 F.3d at 525. Even the
Utah Supreme Court chose to "credit more fully [a defendant's] repeated
statements" during a plea hearing that he did not have the requisite intent to
commit a crime rather than his "acknowledg[ment] at one point" that he did have
the requisite intent. Thurman, 911 P .2d at 375. The district court cannot ignore
Mr. Arriaga's self-defense assertions at the plea hearing, because those assertions
negate his guilty plea and make it not knowing and not voluntary.
Furthermore, the district court erred when it concluded that there was not
a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Arriaga would have rejected the plea and taken
the matter to trial. (Add. A, R. 1220.) First, Mr. Arriaga submitted an affidavit
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that stated that if he had understood his rights, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial. (Add. C, R. 1179.)
Second, the facts proven during the post-conviction proceedings support
his decision to not plead guilty as a rational choice. According to Mr. Arriaga's
trial counsel, the State's case relied on two main pieces of evidence: a statement
from Mr. Arriaga's brother and Mr. Arriaga's statement to the police. (R. 52728.) The brother fled the country and was likely unavailable to testify. (R. 528.)

That left only Mr. Arriaga's statement to the police. That statement, however,
supported Mr. Arriaga's imperfect self-defense claim. Mr. Arriaga told the police
that he got into a fight with the decedent and that the decedent lunged at Mr.
Arriaga before Mr. Arriaga shot him (R. 215.) See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r 34,
192 P.3d 867 (holding that district court properly instructed jury on imperfect

self-defense when the defendant testified that he shot the decedent after the
decedent charged him).
As discussed above, Mr. Arriaga's imperfect self-defense claim, if not

disproved by the State at trial, would have reduced the murder charge to
manslaughter. Because of his plea to murder, Mr. Arriaga was sentenced to 15
years to life imprisonment. (R. 77.) But had he been convicted of manslaughter,
the length of imprisonment would have been much shorter: an indeterminate
term of one to 15 years. Utah Code § 76-3-203(2). It would have been completely
rational for Mr. Arriaga to forgo the plea and instead argue an imperfect self-
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defense claim at trial so that his criminal liability would drop from murder to
manslaughter and his prison time would decrease.
In sum, Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary. Twice
during the plea hearing he made self-defense claims that negated an essential
element of the murder charge and provided objective evidence that he did not
understand the proceedings. And looking beyond the record of the plea hearing,
Mr. Arriaga produced undisputed evidence that the language barrier between
him and his trial counsel prevented him from understanding the nature and
consequences of his plea. The district court erred when it held that Mr. Arriaga's
plea was knowing and voluntary and when it granted summary judgment in favor
of the State. Mr. Arriaga requests that this Court reverse the district court's grant
of summary judgment.
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2.

Mr. Arriaga's Counsel Was Ineffective
Under the Postconviction Remedies Act, a defendant may challenge his

conviction if it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah Code §
78B-9-104(1)(d). Here, Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel was ineffective when he did not
use an interpreter to explain the guilty plea process to Mr. Arriaga. As a result of
that failure, Mr. Arriaga believed he was required to plead guilty to murder.
For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Arriaga must satisfy the

Strickland standard, which requires him to prove "(1) that counsel's performance
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Larrabee, 2013
UT 70,118,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arriaga satisfies the

Strickland standard.
2.1

Mr. Arriaga's Trial Counsel Was Deficient.

Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter
to advise Mr. Arriaga about his guilty plea in a private conference before the
guilty plea proceeding began.
A defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel when being
advised whether to enter a guilty plea. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384
(2012); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). Also, an attorney "shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
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decisions regarding the representation." Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.4(b). "[C]ourts in
other jurisdictions have explained in addressing the constitutional concerns
raised by failing to provide an interpreter for an accused, every criminal
defendant-if the right to be present is to have meaning-[must] possess
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding." Ling v. State, 702 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ga. 2010)
(quotation omitted). In fact, "[o]ne who is unable to communicate effectively in
English and does not receive an interpreter's assistance is no more competent to
proceed than an individual who is incompetent due to mental incapacity." Id.
The undisputed facts underlying Mr. Arriaga's ineffective assistance claim
are set forth fully in Section 1.2 above. In short, Mr. Arriaga is a native Spanish
speaker with a fifth-grade education who did not speak English (with the
exception of a few random words) at the time he pleaded guilty, and his trial
counsel did not speak Spanish. (Add. C, R. 1177; R. 1339-40.)
No interpreter was present when Mr. Arriaga met with his trial counsel
immediately before the guilty plea hearing; because there was no interpreter, Mr.
Arriaga misunderstood his trial counsel's advice about his guilty plea. (Add. C, R.
1177-78.) Mr. Arriaga believed his trial counsel told him that Mr. Arriaga had
already been found guilty and that there was no need for a trial; that if Mr.
Arriaga won at trial, he would still get prison time; and that Mr. Arriaga had to
plead guilty that day. (Id.) Because of the language barrier, Mr. Arriaga did not
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understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was innocent until
proven guilty. (Add. C, R. 1178.)
When Mr. Arriaga walked into the hearing, he was given a plea statement
that was written in Spanish, but he did not read it prior to signing it. (Id.) And
during the hearing, Mr. Arriaga was operating under what he understood from
his trial counsel. (Id.) That Mr. Arriaga misunderstood what was going on is
evidenced by his two assertions during the plea hearing that he acted in selfdefense. (Add. B, R. 413.)
Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel was deficient when he did not use an interpreter
to communicate effectively with Mr. Arriaga about his guilty plea. A criminal
defendant must adequately understand the contours of his constitutional rights
and the facts underlying his plea before he can make an informed decision about
whether to plead guilty and waive his rights. See Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ,r 16.
When the substantive conversation between an attorney and his client about
those protections and those facts takes place without a translator, and the
attorney and the client do not speak the same language, the attorney's conduct
falls below the objective standard of reasonableness. See Ling, 702 S.E.2d at
883.s An attorney cannot fulfill his duties to communicate with his client and to

s Even if trial counsel does use an interpreter, "[t]rial counsel may breach a
duty owed to his client through the ineffective assistance of an interpreter. When
an intermediary, such as an interpreter, is the only means of communication for a
defendant and his attorney, any deficient conduct on the part of the intermediary
can be imputed to the attorney as ineffective assistance." Ledezma v. State, 626
N.W.2d 134, 149 (Iowa 2001).
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give his client sufficient information to make an informed decision when the
attorney and the client speak different languages and no means of translation is
available. Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel was ineffective when he did not use a
translator to communicate with Mr. Arriaga about his guilty plea.
The district court's contrary holding is in error. The district court
concluded, "Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he could not adequately understand
his counsel's advice about the guilty plea, even though a Spanish interpreter was
not present, and therefore has not shown that counsel performed deficiently for
not having a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions." (Add.
A, R. 1269.) But according to the undisputed facts, Mr. Arriaga spoke almost no
English (except for a few random words), and his counsel spoke no Spanish.
(Add. C, R. 1177; R. 1339-40.) With no interpreter present, Mr. Arriaga could not
have understood his trial counsel. In fact, Mr. Arriaga entered the plea hearing
operating under the severe misunderstanding that his attorney told him he had to
plead guilty that day-that he had no choice in the matter. (Add. C, R. 1177-78.)
Mr. Arriaga's acknowledgment in the plea hearing that he understood what
his attorney talked with him about is undermined by his self-defense assertions
during the hearing. (Add. B, R. 412, 414-15.) If Mr. Arriaga truly understood
what his trial counsel told him about the plea, he would not have raised selfdefense claims during the hearing.
Under the undisputed facts, Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel was deficient.
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2.2

Mr. Arriaga Was Prejudiced.

"[W]hen challenging a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a [post-conviction] petitioner must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been
rational under the circumstances." Rippey v. State, 2014 UT App 240, ,I 14, 337
P.3d 1071 (quotation omitted). For the reasons set forth in Section 1.3, above, Mr.
Arriaga has shown that he would not have pleaded guilty and that his decision
would have been rational under the circumstances.
For all these reasons, Mr. Arriaga requests that this Court reverse the
district court's grant of summary judgment on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.

Conclusion
The district court erred when it granted summary judgment on Mr.
Arriaga's post-conviction petition. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence
proves that Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and his
guilty plea was a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Arriaga
respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
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DATED this 9th day of June, 2016.

ADAMS LEGAL LLC

PO Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Benjamin Arriaga
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BENJAMIN ARRIGA,
Petitioner,

vs.

Case No.120404690
Judge:

Charlene Barlow

STATE OF UTAH,
Res ondent.
This matter came before the Court on the State's motion for summary judgment on
petitioner's second amended petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act. The Court
recognizes the assistance ofJames D. Gilson who was appointed by the Court to represent petitioner

pro bono; the Court appreciates his willingness to assist in this case.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Arriaga filed a prose petition for relief under the post-conviction remedies act on April
6, 2012. The Court reviewed the petition and ordered the appointment of counsel on April 12, 2012.
As directed in rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court reviewed the petition and
found that its claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not frivolous on their face and
dismissed all claims not involving the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. A copy of the
pleadings were sent to the Utah Attorney General's Office. The ineffective assistance of counsel
Ci)

claims were allowed to proceed.
The counsel originally appointed to represent Mr. Arriaga was allowed to withdraw and Mr.
Gilson was appointed to represent Mr. Arriaga and was given time to become familiar with the case.
Discovery was pursued and an evidentiary hearing was set for May 23, 2014.
At the hearing on May 23, 2014, Mark Mathis, prosecutor for Mr. Arriaga's case, testified
regarding the charging of the case, the strength of the case in his opinion, and discussions with
defense counsel regarding plea negotiations. Rudy Bautista, trial counsel for Mr. Arriaga, testified
as to his experience, his filing of the motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga's statements to the police, plea
discussions with Mr. Mathis, his investigation into the evidence, the flight of Mr. Arriaga's brother
1
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(who had been considered a potential witness) after release from jail, and (to a limited extent) his
discussions with Mr. Arriaga regarding resolution of the case. The hearing ended when counsel for

Mr. Arriaga asked for time to amend the petition, which request was granted.
The second amended petition was filed on September 19, 2014, with supporting exhibits.
The State filed a motion for summary judgment on November 19, 2014, with supporting exhibits.
A corrected memorandum in support was filed on November 20, 2014. On May 4, 2015, Mr.
Arriaga filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's motion and, on June 8, 2015, the State filed
a reply memorandum.
The Court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2015.
Mr. Arriaga was present with counsel, James D. Gilson; the State was represented by Mark C. Field,
Assistant Attorney General. The Court received argument and took the matter under advisement.
Having reviewed the submissions, including exhibits, and the arguments, the Court now enters its
ruling.

DECISION
The Court finds that summary judgment for the State is appropriate in this case for the
reasons stated in the State's memorandum and reply memorandum in support of the motion.
Generally, the Court finds that Mr. Arriaga's trial counsel acted within reason in his handling of the
case. The Court finds that Mr. Arriaga assured the Court in the plea statement and in the colloquy
that he was satisfied with the advice of his counsel and understood the rights he was giving up. His
self-serving current claims that he didn't read the statement and didn't understand what he was doing
are unavailing to negate his statements at the time of the plea. The Court also finds that there is not
a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Arriaga would have rejected the plea and taken the matter to trial.
His confession was not suppressed and, even if it had not been used at trial, the fact that the victim
was shot five times, twice in the back, and once in the back of the head could have convinced any
reasonable jury that the shooting was not accidental as claimed by Mr. Arriaga.
Within this general outline ofthe Court's reasoning, the Court adopts the specific arguments
that the State made in its memoranda to support the Court's conclusion that summary judgment is
appropriate in this matter.

2
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~

ORDER
The State's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the petition for post-conviction
relief is DENIED.
The State is ordered to prepare an order with findings of fact and conclusions of law

consistent with thi!decision. - ~
DATED this _L_ day of

£;~ ~

,2015.
THE COURT:

3
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MARK C. FIELD (8340)
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: 801-366-0180
markfield@utah.gov
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Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BENJAMIN ARRIAGA,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Petitioner,

vs.

; Case No. 120404690

STATE OF UTAH,

: Judge Charlene Barlow

Respondent.

I

<ii

THIS MATTER COMES BEFORE THE COURT on the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on November 19, 2014. Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga filed his opposition
memorandum on May 4, 2015. The State's reply memorandum was filed on June 8, 2015. Oral
argument on the State's motion was heard on September 4, 2015. Mr. Arriaga was present and
represented by his attorney, James D. Gilson. The State was represented by Mark Field,
Assistant Attorney General. The Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case
law, all applicable rules and statutory provisions, and considered the oral arguments presented by
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counsel. Now being fully advised, the Court enters the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law and order GRANTING the State's motion for summary judgment.
Background
On April 4, 2010, Mr. Arriaga confronted Benacio Herrera in an open field in West
Jordan about claims that Mr. Herrera had slept with Mr. Arriaga's wife. At some point during
the confrontation, Mr. Arriaga pulled a gun out of his waistband. A struggle ensued and the gun
discharged several times. During his interview with police, Mr. Arriaga admitted that he asked
Mr. Herrera whether he had sexual relations with his (Mr. Arriaga's) wife, that Mr. Herrera said
"no," that this made Mr. Arriaga angry and they fought, and that he shot Mr. Herrera, but he only
meant to scare him.
The State charged Mr. Arriaga with several offenses, including murder, a first-degree
felony. Trial counsel, Rudy Bautista filed a motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga's incriminating
statements to police, which the Court denied. Mr. Arriaga then accepted a plea offer from the
prosecutor and agreed to plead guilty to the murder charge in exchange for the other charges
being dismissed. After pleading guilty, he was immediately sentenced to the mandatory term of
15 years to life in prison. He did not pursue a direct appeal.
Mr. Arriaga timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, an amended petition, and
then a second amended petition. He raised several arguments that his conviction should be
vacated. First, he challenged the effectiveness of his attorney's representation. Mr. Arriaga
argued that he spoke little English and because his attorney did not have a Spanish interpreter
present during their private conversations, he misunderstood counsel's advice concerning his
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guilty plea. He also claimed that counsel did not seek discretionary review of the Court's denial
of the motion to suppress, did not use the potentially appealable ruling as a basis for negotiating
a better plea agreement with the prosecutor, did not seek concessions of the prosecutor in
exchange for the guilty plea, did not advise him to go to trial where the defenses of self-defense,
extreme emotional distress, lack of the required mental state, and lack of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to all the elements of the murder charge could have been pursued, and did
not investigate the facts of the case, hire experts, and interview witnesses.
Second, Mr. Arriaga argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
entered. He asserted that because of his limited ability to speak English and trial counsel's
failure to have a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions, he did not
understand that he was innocent until proven guilty, that he did not have to plead guilty, and that
winning at trial would mean no prison time. Third, Mr. Arriaga asserted that because of the
misunderstanding that resulted from his limited ability to speak English and trial counsel's
failure to have a Spanish interpreter present during their private discussions prior to the changeof-plea hearing, he did not understand his right to appeal his conviction, nor did he understand
the time limit for filing an appeal.
The State responded to the second amended petition with a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that relief was not warranted because Mr. Arriaga's post-conviction proffer
failed as a matter of law to establish that he received ineffective representation, that his guilty
plea was invalid, or that he was denied his right to appeal. Mr. Arriaga opposed the State's
motion.
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Findings of Fact

1. Mr. Arriaga was charged on April 14, 20 IO with murder, a first-degree felony,
purchase, transfer, or possession, or use of a firearm by a restricted person, a second-degree
felony, and obstructing justice, also a second-degree felony.
2. The medical examiner's report established that Mr. Herrera was shot five times, once
in the abdomen, once in the leg, twice in the back, and once in the back of the head.
3. A Spanish interpreter was not present when Mr. Arriaga's appointed attorney, Rudy
Bautista, met with him for approximately an hour at the jail and several times when Mr. Arriaga
was transported to the courthouse for a hearing in the case.
4. Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga's incriminating statements to the
police, which the Court denied.
5. Counsel did not seek interlocutory review of the Court's order denying the motion.
6. The prosecutor offered to dismiss the obstructing justice and possession of a firearm
by a restricted person charges in exchange for Mr. Arriaga's guilty plea to the murder charge.
7. Mr. Arriaga accepted this offer.
8. A Spanish interpreter was present at the change-of-plea hearing for the benefit of Mr.
Arriaga and the Court.
9. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he was not suffering from any physical or mental
impairment that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings.
I 0. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he and his attorney fully discussed the contents of the
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea ("Plea Statement"), as well as his rights and
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the consequences of pleading guiJty.
11. The Plea Statement was written in both English and Spanish,
12. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood the contents of the Plea Statement and
that he adopted each statement in it as his own, that he was satisfied with his attorney's advice
and assistance, and that he understood everything that his attorney had discussed with him.
13. Mr. Arriaga told the Court that he had no questions about anything in the Plea
Statement.
14. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged in the Plea Statement and during the plea colloquy that he
understood his right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront
witnesses.
15. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood his right to the presumption of
innocence, and that if he wanted to fight the charges against him and go to trial, all he had to do
was plead not guilty and his case would be set for a trial.
16. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that the elements of the crime of murder to which he was
pleading guilty were that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another.
17. After trial counsel provided the factual basis for the offense, Mr. Arriaga told the
Court that the victim was on drugs and drunk, that he was unsure whether the victim had a
weapon, that he defended himself against the victim, and that it was not his intention to hurt the
victim.
18. Trial counsel explained that he and Mr. Arriaga previously discussed the possibility
of raising a defense of imperfect self-defense because the victim charged at Mr. Arriaga and that
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is why he used the gun.
19. The prosecutor explained that in order for the guilty plea to be valid, Mr. Arriaga
would need to state that he either intentionally caused the death or knowingly caused the death of
the victim.
20. Without objection from Mr. Arriaga, trial counsel stated that Mr. Arriaga had
authorized him to tell the Court that by pulling the trigger he knew that it would cause the
victim's death.
21. Mr. Arriaga specifically acknowledged that he understood that by pulling the trigger
of the gun he knew he could cause the death of the victim.
22. Mr. Arriaga acknowledged that he understood he would be pleading guilty to a firsti)

degree felony and that the minimum and maximum punishment was a prison term of 15 years to
life at the Utah State Prison.
23. Mr. Arriaga also acknowledged that he understood that by pleading guilty he would
be waiving hjs right to appeal his conviction and that ifhe wanted to appeal his sentence, he
would need to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after his sentence was entered.
24. Mr. Arriaga pleaded guilty to the charge of murder and requested the Court to
immediately sentence him to the mandatory term of 15 years to life in prison.
25. Mr. Arriaga did not pursue a direct appeal.

Conclusions of Law
1. Mr. Arriaga bears the burden of pleading and proving the facts necessary to entitle
him to post-conviction relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(1 ).
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2. As the moving party on summary judgment, the State satisfies its burden "by showing,
by reference to 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,' that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,rt 8, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

3. Although Mr. Arriaga is entitled to the benefit of having the Court consider the facts
and inferences in a light most favorable to him, to survive summary judgment he must show that
he "could, if given a trial [or evidentiary hearing], produce evidence which would reasonably
sustain a judgment in his favor." Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, 143, 267 P.3d 232.
4. To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Arriaga must "show
that counsel's performance was deficient" and that the "deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
5. While Mr. Arriaga must show that counsel's actions "fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness," id. at 688, to prove deficient performance, the Court "must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." Id. at 689.
6. To satisfy the prejudice element of the Strickland standard in the context of a guilty
plea challenge based on counsel ineffectiveness, Mr. Arriaga "must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been rational under the
circumstances." Ramirez-Gil v. State, 2014 UT App 122, ,rs, 327 P.3d 1228 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); Hill
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v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
7. Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he should not be bound by the representations he made
during the change-of-plea hearing. See Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 191 (4th Cir. 2000).

Cf Webster v. Sill, 675 P .2d I 170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983)
8. Mr. Arriaga has not shown that he could not adequately understand his counsel's
advice about the guilty plea, even though a Spanish interpreter was not present, and therefore has
not shown that counsel performed deficiently for not having a Spanish interpreter present during
their private discussions.
9. Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his attorney performed deficiently for not seeking
interlocutory review of the Court's order denying the motion to suppress, not seeking a better
plea agreement, not advising Mr. Arriaga go to trial and raise defenses of self-defense, extreme
emotional distress, lack of the required mental state, and lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
as to all the elements of the murder charge could have been pursued, and not investigating the
facts of the case, hiring experts, and interviewing witnesses.
10. Mr. Arriaga also has not shown prejudice because he provides no facts or argument
establishing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that such a decision would have been
rational under the circumstances.
11. As a matter of law, Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his trial attorney was ineffective.
12. A valid plea is "one that has a factual basis for the plea and ensures that the
defendant understands and waives his constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to
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a jury trial, and the right to confront witnesses." Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, 120, 203 P.3d
976.
13. All the constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea were satisfied in Mr.
Arriaga' s case.
14. Even if Mr. Arriaga misunderstood his counsel's advice in relation to the guilty plea,
any misunderstanding was cured by the Court's plea colloquy and the Plea Statement.
15. As a matter of law, Mr. Arriaga has not shown that his guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary.
16. Because Mr. Arriaga was fully informed at the change-of-plea hearing of his right to
appeal and that the notice of appeal had to be filed within 30 days after his sentence was entered,
as a matter of law he has not shown that he did not understand his right to appeal.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga's petition for postconviction relief is DENIED.
This is the final order of the Court. No further action is necessary to effectuate the
Court's order.

fl

In accordance with rule IO(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judge's electronic signature appears at the top of
the first page of this Order. END OF DOCUMENT
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AddendumB
Transcript of change-of-plea hearing (R. 408-16)
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
BENJAMIN ARRIAGA-LUNA,
Defendant.
_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 101400853

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT
COMMITMENT

&

~

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHARLENE BARLOW

WEST JORDAN COURTHOUSE
8080 Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088

APRIL 19, 2011
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4
5
6

FOR THE STATE:
Marc C. Mathis, Esq.
Robert Neill, Esq.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
801-363-7900

7

8
9

10

FOR THE DEFENSE:
Rudy Bautista, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035
Telephone:
801-534-1700

11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25
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APRIL 19, 2011

2

* * *

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr. Bautista is here.

5

MR. MATHIS:

6

THE COURT:

7

8
9

10

This is Case Number 101400853,
Who is here for the state?
Mark Mathis, Rob Neill for the state.
Okay.

Mr. Mathis and Mr. Neill for the

state.
And Mr. Arriaga-Luna has joined us.

What are we

going to do today?
Your Honor, we're going to resolve

MR. BAUTISTA:

11

this matter.

What's anticipated is Benjamin will be entering a

12

guilty plea to count one, murder, a first degree felony.

13

exchange, the remaining counts will be dismissed.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. MATHIS:

16

THE COURT:

17

In

Is that the State's understanding?
It is, Your Honor.
Okay.

Mr. Arriaga-Luna, will you please

state your full name?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

COURT:

Arriaga-Luna.

First name?
Benjamin Arriaga-Luna.

Okay.

Thank you.

How old are you?

I'm 38.

Okay.

Do you have any physical or mental

24

problem that interferes with your ability to understand what

25

you're doing today?
Noteworthy Reporting,

801-634-5549
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

Have you taken any medication, drugs or

alcohol today that would impact your ability to understand?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

No .

Okay.

You are giving up certain rights.

Was there a preliminary hearing held in this?

7

MR. BAUTISTA:

8

THE COURT:

9

No .

There was, Your Honor.

Okay.

You are giving up certain trial

rights by pleading guilty today.

10

presumed to be innocent.

11

against yourself.

12

You have the right to be

You have the right not to testify

You have the right to a speedy and public trial in

13

front of an impartial jury.

14

examine the state's witness and call your own witnesses.

15

have the right to an unanimous verdict on all elements beyond a

16

reasonable doubt.

17

trial.

18
19

You have the right to cross
You

You have certain appeal rights if you go to

You are giving up these rights by pleading guilty
today, do you understand that?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

Yes .

Okay.

There are certain immigration

22

consequences by pleading guilty, too.

23

or you know that you have these consequences, you might be

24

deported by pleading guilty, do you understand that?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

And you -- you address

Yes.
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1

2

Okay.

Thank you.

The change that you're

looking at is a first degree felony.

3

Is there a minimum?

4

MR. BAUTISTA:

5

THE COURT:

6

The potential punishment is 15 years to life in the

It's 15 years to life.

Fifteen to life.

7

Utah State Prison and a $10,000 fine.

8

punishment, do you understand that?

9

~

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

11

competent to enter this plea?

Okay.

MR. BAUTISTA:

13

THE COURT:

14

that he's giving up?

15

That's the potential

Yes .

10

12

Thank you.

Counsel, do you believe that he's

I do.

Do you believe he understands the rights

MR. BAUTISTA:

I do.

We've been working together for

16

over a year.

We did the preliminary hearing, as well as, the

17

motion to suppress which was denied.

i)

18
19

THE COURT:

Okay.

satisfied with the help that your attorney has given you?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

Yes .

Do you fully understand everything that

he's talked to you about?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

Mr. Arriaga-Luna, are you

Yes.

Okay.

I understand.

Have you been through a plea form

with your attorney?
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

what's in that form?

@)

Do you have anymore questions about

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

Yes .

No.

Okay.

None.
Counsel, can you give me a factual

basis?

7

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, on April 4th 2010 in Salt

8

Lake County Mr. Arriaga-Luna confronted a man who had been

9

sleeping with his wife.

An argument and subsequent fight took

10

place at which time he pulled out a firearm and he shot the man

11

killing him.
Is that what happened, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

intention.

15
16
17

I defended myself.

It was not my

I never thought about hurting him.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Does that change the plea at all,

counsel?
MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, we had -- we had discussed

18

the imperfect self-defense concept and that he did pull out a

19

gun to get the man to confess to his sleeping with his wife.

20

And that the man charged at him but he was unarmed.

21

why he used a gun.

22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

So that is

I will find that that is a sufficient

factual basis.
THE DEFENDANT:

He was drugged and drunk and I didn ' t

know if he had a weapon, a knife and that's why I ...
Noteworthy Reporting, 801-634-5549
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Qi

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. MATHIS:

Okay.

Mr. Mathis?

Your Honor, I think for the colloquy to

3

be valid that the defendant will have to state that he did

4

intentionally take the life of Benacio Hernandez-Herrera.

5

had stated earlier that he did not intend for that to happen.

6

I think, for it to be a valid plea, he would need to state to

7

this court that he did intend to take his life.

8

MR. BAUTISTA:

9

THE COURT:

He

Or knowingly, Your Honor.

Or knowingly.

Yes.

Intentionally or knowingly.

10

MR. MATHIS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BAUTISTA:

Yeah.
He is prepared to say, Your Honor,

13

he's asked that I say it, that by pulling the trigger he knew

14

that it would cause the death of the man.

15

THE COURT:

Mr. Arriaga-Luna, do you understand that

16

by pulling the trigger you knew you could cause the death of

17

the gentleman?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

factual basis.

21

enter this plea today?

Yes .

Okay.

Thank you.

I will accept that

Has anyone threatened you or forced you to

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

No.

Has anyone made any promises to you?
No, not [inaudible].

Thank you.

If you feel like you
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1

understand what you're doing and you want to do this today, I

2

will have you go ahead and sign that plea form.
Thank you.

3

Mr. Arriaga-Luna, then to the charge of

4

murder, a first degree felony, how do you plead, guilty or not

5

guilty?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Guilty.

Okay.

Thank you.

I find that

8

Mr. Arriaga-Luna is corrpetent to enter this plea, that he

9

understands the rights that he's giving up, he's had the

10

advantage of counsel, that it's a knowingly and voluntarily

11

plea.

I will accept the plea and sign the plea form.
You have the right to be sentenced in no fewer than

12
13

two, nor more than 45 days from today.

You have the right up

14

until the time of sentencing to request to withdraw this plea.
I)

15

But the request has to be in writing and you would have to have

16

good cause.

17

you changed your mind.

You would have to have a good reason not just that

18

What's anticipated with sentencing?

19

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, we had discussed his

20

options.

He would ask the court to sentence him today.

He

21

understands that he is going to the Utah State Prison.

22

asking to start his time there.

23

being sentenced today he will be waiving an opportunity to file

24

a motion, withdraw his plea and understands so and is willing

25

to do so.

He's

He also understands that by
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1

THE COURT:

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE

4

Does the state have any input?

5

MR. MATHIS:

COURT:

Is that is correct, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?
Yes .

Okay.

Thank you.

No, the state would go along with that

6

recommendation, Your Honor.

This case has involved the murder

7

of an individual who was an illegal alien.

8

speaking with the ME's office and law enforcement, there is no

9

known family members that are here.

To our knowledge in

I believe that they are

10

still all in Mexico.

And so as far as, like, representing to

11

the court anything from their side, I think that the crime

12

speaks for itself.
Okay.

Anything further, Mr. Bautista?

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BAUTISTA:

15

Anything else you want to tell me, Mr. Arriaga-Luna?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

It is the order of the court then that you serve a

None, Your Honor.

We would submit.

No, that's all.

Okay.

Thank you.

19

prison term of 15 years to life at the Utah State Prison and I

20

will have you taken there forthwith.

21
22
23

24

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, that's my only matter, may

I be excused?
THE COURT:

Yes, thank you.
(End of Hearing.)

25
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AddendumC
Mr. Arriaga's affidavit (R. 1176-81)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

___

- ~mes D .. G i\6cln (S: -nz-) _ _ _ _ ___ .
__ C..a Iii o+ex J\j e.be\.<e~- & l':ic:. C l\\l.ough
_ Z. i_an.s ..13. an.lc. B <..c i\ d iJ13 . . - - · 1

_·--. -- _ .. \_O___Eas+ ,5outb. Tem.r1e,_ Stu'ie __ g_QO.______
... SC-tlt _L.ake .C,~, .UT BH. \3:J
__ . ____ _
.. "Te--\e~hQ.rte ! _ -~OL- 550=_-C:3.00
. Fcu::,G., rn if e ~ __ ~ o. l - 3 GY - 'i I 2.1
~ -o-w ii : jg i\st'.l n @ en rn \aw . c.001

____ . ______ _

·r N -rtl E

Tl-trRD Su'D\C.1 AL Dl-S:TlZ.\CT C.u.Lt'R7
__ .5A.L3__ Lf½~£ C.O_lU\j.:}'_'f.. ST/tTe.. o.F._llTA l-\

.'BL N.:I.A.t'J.\ \N _f\~'K \f\ 9A, .... f\J.F \.D.A~ \l". of .. __ _
Pc-·h ti.of\~.:<,
_. ______1?;.E N_J_A_\'!.\tl\\. J\R:KV\.6.A..... __
. _ . ...

\N. SU ?P.o.R1~ of __

.. --·- __ S_Ec.01\)1) __ A.1YLL1\.U).\:..\:>.. .

. . . _ .·-· ____ .. _ ..
__ o-.x £ _\ \.TU~ N cK~
, O \.
£ L\£ E
____ .. .
_ ........ U..l'JD.E'1 .-:THE. ~06T.... Co N \I\ C.Tl o N ~-~ \\!'\ ~vJ E'S

.. .J\.c:-:r

_

-

'3ud_3e. Chavle.ne. ~c:t--dow __
I.., 13e.njami~ A-.;,ria..op, h.avin3 he.en dul~ .
~wo'fn, -tes+i~'.J and alle._ge as -fot\owo:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
\ ofLibrary,
G
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11.76

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1177

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.... 1178

.

-that

oo-\- ~3 rn~ -¼MJ \

I. di~

'<to d comm t -\ted --\11 e c..,, me o-t
n1.uv-d ec ( 6 ee. e x'n't b~+ 3 ).
\\. T f' I \t\ad K(lown -\-\nee\- I l0 a.s
\n.de~cl ,nnocen-\- un+, \ rro\Jen qu, \-\-\\
o.-\- i ct\ 1 -\-\. cc\- cu io (l in 3 o. -h--\ a \ ''LI o cd 0
\Tl ean no ~rioon -\-1me, and -4.a+ T d,d
M--\- \rlo.\le +a Q\ead :)U.!l+~, I would
no+ rla\/e pleaded. <3u1 t+:3 loLL+ wou\d
have lnsb+ed on <3oin3 -l--o-hial .
. _1'.l. As a. re.5(J.~ o.f' -llie ~o~floin';j,
did noi \..mdecti+and m~ Y\gnt +o
O.f()ea.\ m~ coovic-t1~_n, no_., ~;o\ · T
.
unde,sta.nd -±vie. +nne \, m -:fux ..q \1 ng

+,

an a

+

rf eal.

.\ "3 ..

,+

.

.

.

fa., \.e.c\ -\-o -\-a\<e. -\he
·+-o .ad eq u a+ e.l 2J l.ea n

:0. a u+i.s-±a.

n -ec_e_ss a r.-~
Y+he.. f'ac.:.+s ~tm~ c.a:5e ~, +a ~)(1_J\alt1
m:1 te.5.a.\ r-15\i+s, ~r,t-ions, and det:enses.
, ~- \-\ad. :@iau+-1-s+G\ -\-a.K.e.o -the -\-in1.e
+o ad~qua.te.lG\ k1~es+i:~t-+-e m<j case,
1rn e

6e\,~'1e. -\-\'1:d_r-e. \S Cl x:x;a6.o.a.alo\.e
.\\ . e ·\ o.o
t .wo. u\ a\ Ylu\Je 'oee(l
a c.C\ u.i-\\: e.d o{"' D'H.A Y-d -e.'( o..
Ia \

+-+'f

mc(y . \la\J.e. \J£e.n c..onvtc.te.c.,
u.nd e, '6ne. of' -\t\ e mans\ au3\ri+eys+a+ u+.e~s .
_
\5. 'bQu-\-fs+a die\ no-\-1e\\ me
abc•u.+ an~ \ec(,+ima+e ckfenses
a\J0t, \a \o\'e: +d me \f' -r_ L~ en-t -\-o
6'<

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1179

~

f ,, a\..

. _ _ . - -- - - -- ------··

\ .6... I
~

\ en \f n eek

-fr-o rr.1 ...o~b .eJ~.

· i ... ~1~.ud . q u \ \~ 1
Ex+.r.em.e. ..E.m.e>n cna\ D Ls{re_ss' .

in '01 a+ e 6

1

of~Le'f.

o0ou.-\. M C\Y1 sla.u3hhL. and. -:t=m rerf'e.d-. '5.e.l f'-

5

. e.feo ,s.e Man "c> \au Yt.\---e'<.
, ..
...
.....
\::1. 13a~ed on m:1 .\J <2.rs:10.0 o ..f' !he
_acts., .as.ocxHin7~ 'tt1 m ~ DLi{jl.nal
~ro s..e. 6. 5 _c -(2 e·-\-\~ on a.nck a ~s .
_ . __ __ .
re\a+ed .. :±-n. +r.ia\~ _c_oun.seJ1 I .w.a. 6
.en--\i-\-\,ec\ ~ .Ju 1.~ lns+md--i o os 60
.E: x± re.\11 e . 'E. ,11 o-~ o na\ '\)is-\:-.r-e.~D_
.MaY1-s\aL,L,:)'1ti+e'( and lmpe'f ~ec.+ Se\ f'-

_.

Ir

. Def'ea.se. \V\ans\aush--\--e'(
"I. h~d
.
\o e e(L .cal\ c..w .e.d :-to .\7.-R> ceed :-\-n_ hLa.\.__ ___
__ . _ .\~ . .tof_ -\\iese rea.s.onei, and . .-fu.,.
__ .o-\-h er-s- ~0.\\.~_ ex.e.\aiV1e.d

b.~-- -½1e

ro.ctt n~3 b.ci e-£ -G.... -\hi 6

d . . ,. ..,. .. . ...

-

S.:e co O
..am.e.o.ded ......~.e~±t.o.n 1 . l ..Gt~_\< __±½a±__I._ ________ _ -••- ···- -··----~

.. 5u.()

YJ£ -~raff~e.cL 9-:e:cmt -56.1 o.n -+o .w.;::-\b.d Q:l.U..L
'<YI~ ' rl ea o.o.d m <J Co ovlc±i.Dl\.. a..od . s~n+ence. b. e \l. aca+ect. ____ __ .....
.

••

. ,-c

.•

-·-

. ... .

.. .

....... •'

____.

.

. SW O'R N TO -th.is__ /0-3-

.Oc1--:o~e.x __, z.o l L\.

do.<:10£..

___ . _________ _

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
5 (:,1- (
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

1180 _

.

. JAMES GOLl .
-NOTAAYPUll.JC•STATEOF 1/TAH
COMMISSION# 854899

• .. . . . COMM. EXP. 04-18-2016

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1181

